Mechanisms that distort political perception on social media

Introduction. Information methods of political management are implemented by influencing the political perception of citizens. Political perception is carried out consciously and requires critical thinking and cognitive efforts, but it affects the areas of the unconscious and subconscious, including the deep level of collective and cultural stereotypes, attitudes, and frames. In the modern Russian information field, the Telegram social network operates, which is of great importance for all users and, in particular, for participants in political discourse.

Purpose. To analyze the processes that form the mechanisms that distort political perception in the Internet space, including: intentions towards information distortion and the formation of barriers to interpretation, theory and practice of cancellation, the dissemination of viral content, the formation of post-truth; the production of texts at the request of the customer; accounting for user activity; setting structured, multitasking goals when creating publications.

Methods. Using the method of system analysis, the structure of the Telegram social network and the patterns of processes functioning in it were investigated. When combined, such processes form mechanisms that distort the political perception of users.

Results. The trends and trends that are clearly expressed in the information policy space have been identified. Firstly, the processes that form the mechanisms of distortion of political perception include theories and practices of cancellation, the dissemination of viral content, and the design and reformulation of posttruth. Secondly, the impact on the political perception of users is through the production of custom texts, the content of which varies depending on the purpose of the customer. Thirdly, user activity is recorded, and the content of political posts and entire channel grids is adapted to the user's request. Fourth, any publication involves several tasks, so the impact on the audience presupposes the achievement of multitasking goals.

Conclusions. It can be argued that the political perception of users of the Telegram network is influenced by information. However, this social network remains trusted as a channel for insider political information. The main trend in the political media space is the creation of convenient, easy–to-understand, but useful, "compressed" and ordered political content. We note the special relevance of the author's content, which is associated in the minds of citizens with specific media personalities, politicians, and leaders. Users don't have enough personalities to interpret what they perceive. A very important developing trend in the current political realities is the trend towards the inability to buy a blogger or order content. For perceiving subjects, awareness of the position of specific people and the exclusion of the possibility of "customized" opinions and positions becomes of paramount importance. Let's pay attention to the trend of integrating political information into entertainment content. Finally, a global trend is the formation of an individual information field in which the user finds himself and in which he perceives, among other things, the political reality. The basis of such preferences is trust in sources or authors. The selected channels form the specifics of the political consciousness and perception of the subject.

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